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Linear and non-linear damage cost functions are assumed for NOX emissions and 
their impacts on the empirical results are explored for first time. The paper also 
provides numerical estimates of the potential benefits from co-operation. 
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1 An earlier version of this paper has been presented as: 
 
Halkos, G., 1997. ‘Modelling Optimal Nitrogen Oxides Abatement in Europe’, 
Department of Economics, Discussion Paper Series, Number 97-03, University of 




 Acidification and other environmental problems are associated with the long-
range transport of sulphur and nitrogen oxides which require a co-ordinated strategy 
to control emissions. Although the detrimental effects of acidification were initially 
centred on sulphur, nitrogen depositions (in the form of nitrogen oxides and 
ammonia) are also an important factor contributing to various environmental 
problems. Some nitrogen in the atmosphere originates from natural sources such as 
oceans, lighting, volcanoes, etc.,  but the main source of nitrogen oxides emissions is 
energy combustion in power stations, industrial boilers and vehicles.  
 Throughout Europe the contribution of sulphur, nitrogen oxides and ammonia 
to total acidification is 60%, 20% and 20% respectively. Erisman (1991) claims that 
the contribution of nitrogen to total acidification is approximately 50% but it is 
higher in some European countries like the Netherlands (almost 70%).  NOX is a 
short-hand for nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Almost 50% of 
European NOX emissions are due to traffic and most of the rest comes from power 
stations and industrial boilers. This varies from country to country. For instance, in 
the UK less than 30% of NOX emissions is produced by traffic and most of  the rest 
comes from stationary sources. 
 Nitrogen oxides and ammonia have impacts on vegetation and human health. 
They contribute to nitrogen saturation of soils and lakes and the resulting nitrogen 
leaching leads to nitrate pollution of groundwater. If they are converted into nitric 
acid they contribute to acidification of soils and lakes. Nitrogen oxides may be 
transferred over long distances. NOX reacts with hydrocarbons in the presence of 
sunlight and contributes to the formation of photochemical oxidants known as smog. 
Breathing smog irritates the lungs and can lead to asthma. Usual symptoms are throat 
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pain, eye irritation and coughing.  Nitrogen dioxide contributes to kidney and heart 
damage. At high concentrations this pollution can be fatal.  
 Acidification provides a classic instance of economic inefficiency, as 
countries do not bear the full costs of the damage they cause. The recognition of the 
problems of pollution has led to political action within many countries on emission 
standards and regulations. However, the transboundary nature of the problem 
requires an international co-ordinated policy. This was first recognised by the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, signed by 35 European 
countries (among them the EU and the UK), the USA and Canada. In 1985 a protocol 
was added to the Convention committing signatories to  reduce sulphur emissions by 
at least 30% by 1993 as compared with their 1980 emission levels (the ‘30% Club’).  
 Negotiations in NOX are however more complicated than those on SO2, since 
there are no broadly accepted international air quality and emission standards on 
NOX.  This is due to the fact that there are differences in the domestic structure of 
industry and road transport between ECE members states. Most countries seem able 
to meet their specified sulphur emissions reductions but have difficulties in reducing 
NOX emission levels as in NOX abatement there is a large number of small polluters 
which act in an uncoordinated way.   In addition, sulphur emissions seem easier to 
control than NOX as a higher fraction of sulphur is deposited within 100 km of the 
source and can be attributed to individually large stationary sources like power 
stations and industrial  boilers.  In contrast NOX are produced by both stationary and 
mobile (vehicles) sources.  We must therefore avoid simply treating collective action 
problems identically even if they involve the same participants, as key components 
(group size, cost differences, etc.) may differ (Sandler, 1992).  
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 After the importance of nitrogen deposition was recognised, the first 
international agreements were made in order to reduce emissions in Europe. On 31 
October 1988, a number of countries signed the Sofia Protocol on the control of NOX 
emissions which committed the signatories to stabilise their emissions up to 1994 at 
the level of any year between 1980 and 1987. Twelve European countries declared 
the intention to reduce their NOx emissions by 30%, and six countries promised no 
further increase2 .   
A month later (24 November 1988) the European Community drafted a 
Directive (88/609/EEC) to limit sulphur and NOX emissions from large combustion 
plants known as the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD). When the LCPD 
was drafted in 1988, ten out of twelve EEC countries had already met the stricter 
reductions mandated for 1997. Luxembourg (near the target) and Greece (far away 
from its target) were the two exceptions (Council of the European Communities, 
1988).  But for Europe, and at the end of 1992, reductions from 1987 levels were 
almost 3% on average. This implies that agreements to follow on NOX will need to 
allow a longer time for achievement of targets. 
 Obviously the assumption of uniform percentage reductions in emissions by 
each country is inefficient, as the costs and opportunities for emission control vary 
between countries. Environmental objectives may vary because ecosystems are not 
uniformly assimilative of SO2 and NOx.  In addition, the evaluation of damage 
caused by depositions varies across countries; SO2 and NOx are non-uniformly 
mixing pollutants and the pattern of depositions varies with the locational pattern of 
                                                        
2 It is important to mention that as the base year selected by countries is not known these 
commitments were included here in the current reduction plans and using 1980 as the base 
year.  If countries are not committed to the Protocol then we assume that there is no 
abatement in these countries.  The analysis here will be limited to nitrogen oxides as the 
polluting substance to control. Ammonia was not part of the Convention but some countries 
like Sweden have specified national objectives for reducing ammonia emissions.   
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sources.  Maler (1990) and Halkos (1994) have demonstrated the inefficiency of the 
30% Club agreement by showing that a 40% reduction in total emissions is possible 
for the same total abatement cost by allocating abatement expenditure to equalise 
marginal costs across European countries. This ‘cost-effective’ allocation, however, 
would run into the same problems as the uniform emission reductions in securing 
agreement and implementation, since the net benefits would be unequally distributed, 
and could be negative for some countries. The problem of free-riding is serious in 
such circumstances. Barrett (1994) therefore claims that treaties containing more 
than a few participants are unlikely to achieve big co-operative gains.  
 Economic theory can predict the rational level of abatement under a variety of 
assumptions, ranging from completely non-cooperative to the fully co-operative 
cases. The benchmark against which to judge the benefits of co-operation is the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium, in which each country takes the policies of its 
neighbours as given, optimising within that context. The general principles of game 
theory in the pollution context are set out in Hoel (1991), but there have been few 
empirical applications so far reported.   This paper uses new abatement data and 
model specifications to provide alternative numerical estimates of the potential 
benefits from co-operation.  The results reported here differ from any previously 
reported, as in that abatement costs are derived from detailed plant-level research for 
each country.   In our analysis we use the current reduction plans as the current level 
of abatement and try to optimise abatement efforts by allocating responsibility to 
European countries according to their contribution to damage as well as their cost-
effectiveness in abating NOX emissions.   Linear and non-linear damage cost 
functions are assumed for NOX emissions and their impacts on the empirical results 
are explored for first time.  
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Modelling optimal abatement 
Measurement and approximation of abatement cost functions 
 In discussing emissions reduction, it is necessary to distinguish between 
primary abatement (by such means as switching to low -or nitrogen-free fuels, 
improved energy efficiency, conservation or any other measure reducing the output 
of electricity, heating, transportation etc.) and secondary. Secondary abatement 
involves the removal of nitrogen oxides from emissions before burning (e.g. by fuel 
switching), during burning (e.g. by combustion modifications, low NOX burners, 
fluidized bed combustion) or after burning (e.g. by Flue Gas Denitrification).  In this 
paper we are primarily concerned with the optimal pattern of secondary abatement.  
 The cost of an emission abatement method is given by the total annualised 
cost (TAC) of an abatement option, including capital and operating cost components:     
  TAC = [(TCC) * (r / (1-(1+r)-n)] + VOMC + FOMC            
where TCC is the total capital cost ($), VOMC and FOMC are the variable and fixed 
operating and maintenance costs ($) respectively and (r/(1-(1+r)-n) is the capital 
recovery factor at real discount rate r, which converts a capital cost to an equivalent 
stream of equal annual future payments, considering the time value of money 
(represented by the discount rate, r); n represents the economic life of asset (in 
years). The estimation of the annual operating and maintenance costs requires a great 
deal of information (for example, the nitrogen content of fuel used, the annual 
operating hours, removal efficiencies of the control methods, etc.) and consists of a 
fixed portion dependent on the use of the plant (e.g. maintenance and labour costs) 
and a variable portion dependent on the prices for electricity, labour, construction,  
sorbents and waste disposal and the specific demand for energy due to the abatement 
process.  Table 1 presents the applicability requirements, the abatement efficiencies 
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and the capital and operating costs of the main abatement options, as well as an 
estimate of the cost-effectiveness for each abatement technology (Halkos, 1996).  
 
Table 1:  Nitrogen oxides emission abatement options and costs (costs in $ million 1985). Costs for 
stationary sources are based on a new 500 MW power plant, using hard coal of 1% nitrogen content, 




















(e.g. oil to gas) 
All  
users 


























SCR    
SNCR 






















Power   plants  
and  
industrial boilers 





Automobiles Up to 30 $45-$84 Fuel 
efficiency      
change  







80 $210 Fuel 
efficiency  
change -5%   
to +15% 






Automobiles 90 $170-520 Fuel 
efficiency                                            




(1)    We have assumed there are no incremental operating costs associated with these modifications. 
(2)   Excluding catalyst’s costs  
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 The abatement costs (per tonne NOX removed) will vary among countries as a 
result of country -specific factors such as nitrogen content of fuels used, capacity 
utilisation, size of installations and labour, electricity and construction cost factors. 
In view of the differences between countries, with regard to both present and future 
energy demand, energy mix, and fossil fuel qualities, the optimal technology must be 
determined on a country-by-country basis.  Full details of the abatement costs 
functions used here are reported in Halkos (1996). These control functions are based 
on research conducted using information at the level of the individual power station. 
The International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA, Austria) cost 
estimates are based on more aggregate data. The basic idea behind the derivation of 
cost functions is to find the least-cost abatement technologies for each country for 
any given level of nitrogen oxides abatement. The national cost curve therefore 
consists of a large number of very small steps, each step representing an abatement 
measure for an individual source that achieves an emission reduction of an extra unit 
at the least cost across all other units in the country. As an example, Figure 1 
presents the total abatement cost curve for Sweden.   
 For analytical purposes, it is necessary to approximate the national cost 
curves by a functional form, at least over a relevant range such as that between 
current abatement levels and the values implied by International Agreements. Least 
squares equations of the form:    
   CAi   = a0i + a1i   NORi +  a2i   NORi
2 
where CAi  is abatement cost and NORi are tonnes of NOX removed, yield 
satisfactory approximations for all the countries analysed in this paper. It is assumed 
that CAi functions are strictly convex with CAi
 >0  and CAi
>0,  i. 
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Damage cost function and its approximation 
 Similarly, the damage cost function depends on NOX deposits, and is also 
country-specific.  It is expressed as: 
   DCi  =  DCi (Di)    (and with  DCi  > 0) 
where DCi is the damage cost and Di is deposits of NOX in each country. This 
function is assumed to be strictly increasing.  Deposits are presented in the 
international transfer matrix, provided by the European Monitoring and Evaluation 
Program (Norwegian Meteorological Institute; EMEP 1993) and which can be 
expressed as follows: 
    Di=j dij (Ej-NORj) + DiB.       
where  the parenthesis estimates the net emissions from country i which are given by 
the difference between uncontrolled emissions (Ej) and tonnes of NOX removed 
(NORj). These emissions are the output of power stations, petroleum refineries, 
industries and vehicles, which we take here as exogenous. dij is the proportion of net 
emissions from country j which are deposited in country i: these proportions are 
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assumed fixed. Country i also receives DiB, other backgrounds deposits (from the rest 
of the world, volcanoes, etc.).  
 It is often assumed for empirical purposes that the damage function is a linear  
function of deposits (see e.g. Maler (1989,1990) and Newbery (1990)), while 
theoretical work assumes convexity i.e. DCi
’’>0 (see e.g. Welsch, 1993; Halkos and 
Hutton, 1993; Hutton and Halkos, 1995). Relative to the damage functions, it is more 
likely that doubling the rate of deposition will more than double the damage caused. 
But as the consequences of acidification cannot be identified with any certainty, we 
infer parameters by assuming that countries act non-cooperatively (like Nash agents) 
equating national marginal damage cost with national marginal abatement cost, the 
latter being obtained from the cost functions described above. Here we will compare  
both assumptions of linearity and convexity.  
Modelling abatement and damage costs  
 For each country i the total cost arising from a given level of nitrogen oxides 
emissions is assumed to be given as:  
   TCi  =  PCi + CAi  (NORi) + DCi  (Di) 
where  PCi  is production costs (omitted here for simplicity),   CAi is abatement cost 
and DCi is damage cost.  As mentioned, cost of abatement is modelled by quadratic 
functions of nitrogen oxides removed, and we assume damage costs are also 
quadratic in deposits, so we have: 
  TCi=[a0 i+ aliNORi+a2i NORi
2]+ [c0i + cli Di+ c2i Di
2] 
The non-cooperative case is modelled as the multilateral Nash equilibrium, with 
NOR as the choice variable and with the first-order conditions yielding the reaction 
functions.  In the social welfare (SW) maximisation case, each country chooses 
abatement (NORi) to set aggregate marginal cost to zero.  The optimum is achieved 
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by equating the individual marginal abatement cost to the negative of marginal 
damage cost. As marginal damage costs (with respect to abatement) are negative and 
marginal abatement costs are increasing, it is clear that abatement is higher under 
SW maximisation.  But social welfare equilibrium requires side-payments to ensure 
that no country is a net loser relative to the Nash non-cooperative solution and that 
agreement on monitoring and on the measurement of abatement and damage costs 
can be reached.  
 It follows from the first order condition that when total cost is minimised with 
respect to NORi: 
   c2i=[(ali+2 a2i NORi)/2 dii Di]-(cli  /2Di). 
If, like Maler (1989,1990) and Newbery (1990), we set c2i=0, then cli=(ali+2a2i 
NORi)/dii, and total cost becomes:  
 TCi=[a0i+ali NORi+a2i NORi
2]+[c0i  + {(ali+2 a2i NORi)/dii }Di ]                   (i) 
Instead, if we want to retain nonlinearity, we restrict cli and c2i becomes  
    c2i=(ali+2a2iNORi)/2diiDi                   
yielding total costs of 
 TCi=[a0i+ali NORi+a2i NORi
2]+[c0i  + {(ali+2a2iNORi)/2dii }Di ]                  (ii) 
Comparing (i) and (ii), this choice obviously halves the implied total damage costs at 
the optimum; and the positive second derivative means that the benefits from 
reductions in deposits will also be less than those implied by a linear damage 
function.  
Numerical Results 
 The empirical estimates derived here show that fully co-operative secondary 
abatement policy would raise the average abatement rate from 6% in total (or 20% 
for countries committed to the protocol) to 33.5% (in the case of a linear damage 
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function) and to 27% (for a quadratic damage function).   Table 2 compares the 
current reduction plans (actual or planned) and the derived SW abatement rates for 
all countries and the average for Europe, based on IIASA’s data on NOX emissions. 
Countries with positive signs may increase their emissions.   
It can be seen that the SW rate considerably exceeds the current rates, and in 
the cases of  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, former Czechoslovakia, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, UK and the former Yugoslavia very large 
increases are indicated.  Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland will have to abate slightly more according to the model’s prediction 
compared with the current reduction plans. Overall, the average SW abatement rate 
is about six times and more than four times higher when we assume linear and 
quadratic damage cost functions respectively compared to the current reduction 
plans.   
 Table 3 presents the costs of abatement according to the CRP and the SW 
optimising cases. It can be seen that the implication of the CRP costs $1.05 bn and 
achieves an emissions reduction of almost 6%.  Here we rely on emissions levels 
projected for the year 2000. As it can seen from Table 2, almost half of the European 
countries have agreed to a 30% reduction in their emissions compared to a based 
year (which was taken to be 1980) whilst six countries promised no further increase. 
However, total European emissions are expected to decline by only 6% due to the 
economic development in Southern European countries which did not agree to any 
emissions reduction. So we try here to optimise the abatement scenario and to see 
what countries can achieve, taking into account not only the abatement cost, but also 
the damage cost imposed on themselves and their neighbours.  
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Table 2:  Abatement rates in % assuming linear and non-linear  






Linear   Social 
Welfare    
Quadratic Social  
Welfare 
Albania 28 +64 9.5 6 
Austria 239 30   45 39 
Belgium 439 30 53 44 
Bulgaria 357 0 43 31 
Former Czech 796 0 48 36 
Denmark 250 30 35 32 
Finland 234 30 34 32 
France 1944 30 30 30 
Germany 3741 30 53 42 
Greece 239 +82 7 3 
Hungary 305 +18 38 28 
Ireland  89 +31 18 15.5 
Italy 1458 30 48 33 
Luxembourg 31 30 40 33 
Netherlands 577 30 37 32 
Norway 169 30 33 28 
Poland 1597 0 32 22 
Portugal 149 +51  19 16 
Romania 661 +29 39 26 
Spain 950 0 40 27 
Sweden 333 30 33 31 
Switzerland 186 30 37 35 
Turkey 356 +192 3.5  3.0 
UK 2324 0 29 20 
Former USSR 9454 0 19 15 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
394 +45 50 34 
AVERAGE/TOT
AL 
27317 6 33.5 27 
Emissions levels in 1980 are in thousand tonnes of NOX (Source: Amann, 1989) 
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Table 3:    Nash and social welfare abatement costs assuming linear and  










Albania 0 1.4 1.2 
Austria 17.3  41.7 36.23 
Belgium 24.31 131.21 111.32 
Bulgaria 38.76 148.9 63.3 
Former Czech 11.6 92.95 49.6 
Denmark 5.2 14.7 10.37 
Finland 18.17 58.3 23.7 
France 66.4 81.1 72.4 
Germany 156.3 508.42 341.2 
Greece 0 5.85 2.46 
Hungary 0 23.24 15.11 
Ireland  0 2.3 1.6 
Italy 434.27 701.2 563.3 
Luxembourg 6.43 11.29 7.4 
Netherlands 7.94 30.52 13.8 
Norway 43.63 59.86 46.4 
Poland 18.2 83.4 52.7 
Portugal 0 16.36 14.2 
Romania 0 122.83 60.9 
Spain 73.4 270.02 83.6 
Sweden 10.68 15.94 11.43 
Switzerland 4.73 8.3 5.81 
Turkey 0 5.75 5.7 
UK 47.41 367.9 196.33 
Former USSR 68.3 425.27 230.4 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
0 254.3 98.8 




With the assumption of a linear damage cost function we can achieve an 
almost 6 times higher emissions reduction with an only 3.5 times higher  cost, or 
more than 4 times higher emissions reduction with slightly less than double the cost 
when we assume a quadratic damage cost function.  The implied abatement cost is 
high for Belgium, former Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, Romania, the former 
USSR, the UK and the former Yugoslavia and relatively low for Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Turkey. 
 Table 4 presents the damage cost estimates when we assume linear and non-
linear damage cost functions and when countries co-operate or act independently. It 
is interesting to note that assuming linear damage costs implies a damage cost of $8 
bn while if we assume a quadratic damage function the cost is halved.  On the other 
hand, the SW solutions are nearer for both linear and quadratic cases compared with 
the non-cooperative solutions. The industrialised countries, and mainly Germany, the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland and some Eastern European 
countries face very high damage costs. 
 Looking at the total numbers and at Table 5, we see that acting independently 
yields total costs of  $9.1 bn when we assume a linear damage cost function and 
$5.1b when we assume a non-linear damage cost function.  If countries co-operate, 
and if we assume a linear damage cost function, this leads to a 33.5% emissions 
reduction with a cost of $8.6 bn, which consists of a damage cost equal to $5.1 bn 
and an abatement cost of $3.5 bn. On the other hand, assuming a quadratic damage 
cost function leads to a 27% emissions reduction implying a total cost of $5 bn which 
is associated with an abatement cost of $2.1 bn and a damage cost of $2.9 bn. These 
results should be expected, since the scenario of the current reduction plan relies on 
the idea that countries act independently trying a certain emission target in the first 
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stage and then attempt to see if they can achieve better emission and deposition 
levels if they co-operate. 
Table 4:    Nash and social welfare damage costs assuming linear and  
                             non-linear damage cost  functions (in m $ 1985) 




Linear Social Welfare 
damage cost 
Quadratic Social 
Welfare damage cost 
Albania 7.0 3.5 4.17 2.1 
Austria 101.74 50.87 94.13 42.88 
Belgium 34.3 17.15 23.84 11.86 
Bulgaria 105.4 52.7 73.95 36.82 
Former Czech 344.82 172.41 191.02 90.96 
Denmark 277.22 138.61 181.46 103.1 
Finland 106.16 53.08 73.82 52.78 
France 399.7 199.85 304.34 180.72 
Germany 1224.46 612.23 729.4 406.08 
Greece 70.16 35.08 43.0 25.66 
Hungary 264.22 132.11 178.44 92.94 
Ireland  23.72 11.86 18.82 8.22 
Italy 541.52 270.52 336.16 167.32 
Luxembourg 11.2 5.6 9.06 5.16 
Netherlands 189.24 94.62 115.52 42.74 
Norway 687.32 343.66 506.22 324.24 
Poland 844.1 422.05 583.92 357.96 
Portugal 33.02 16.51 30.32 11.1 
Romania 359.3 179.65 193.78 99.34 
Spain 505.06 252.53 283.75 227.4 
Sweden 149.6 74.8 120.44 73.22 
Switzerland 228.26 114.13 156.9 88.64 
Turkey 36.47 30.9 32.88 25.9 
UK 580.68 290.34 342.9 168.9 
Former USSR 585.88 292.94 318.48 161.82 
Former Yugoslavia 296.02 148.01 151.94 92.48 




Table 5:   Nash and social welfare total costs (in m $ 1985) 




and social welfare 
total cost 
GAIN  
(Linear )  
GAIN  
(Quadratic)  
Albania 7.0          5.75 3.5           3.3 +1.43 +0.2 
Austria 119.04         135.83 68.17          79.11 -16.79 -10.94 
Belgium 58.61         155.05 41.46         123.18 -96.44 -81.72 
Bulgaria 144.16         222.85 91.46        100.12 -78.69 -8.66 
Former Czech 356.42        283.97 184.01        140.56 +72.45 +43.45 
Denmark 282.42           
196.16 
143.81          113.47 +86.25 +30.34 
Finland 124.33           
132.12 
71.25         76.48 -7.79 -5.23 
France 466.1         385.44 306.25      253.12 +80.66 +53.13 
Germany 1380.76         
1227.82 
768.53       747.28 +142.94 +21.25 
Greece 70.16         48.85 35.08        28.12 +21.31 +6.96 
Hungary 264.22         201.68 132.11         108.05 +62.54 +24.06 
Ireland  23.72            21.12 11.86           9.82 +2.6 +2.04 
Italy 975.79       1037.36 704.79       760.62 -61.57 -55.83 
Luxembourg 17.63          20.35 12.03           12.52 -2.72 -0.49 
Netherlands 197.18         146.04 102.56         56.54 +51.14 +46.02 
Norway 730.95        566.08 387.29       370.64 +164.87 +16.65 
Poland 862.3         667.32 440.25         410.66 +194.98 +29.59 
Portugal 33.02           46.68 16.51            25.3 -13.66 -8.79 
Romania 359.3           316.61 179.65         160.24 +42.69 +19.41 
Spain 578.46         553.77 325.93            311.0 +24.69 +14.93 
Sweden 160.28          136.38 85.48           84.65 +23.9 +0.83 
Switzerland 232.99           165.2 118.86          94.45 +67.79 +24.41 
Turkey 36.47          35.63   30.9             31.6 -2.16 -0.7 
UK 628.09         710.8 337.75         365.23 -82.71 -27.48 
Former USSR 654.18          743.75 361.24          392.22 -89.57 -30.98 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
296.02        406.24 148.01           
191.28 
-110.22 -43.27 
TOTALS 9060          8582 5109          5050         +478 +59 
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 Finally, the social welfare maximization (SW) rates can be compared with the 
Nash rates to indicate the magnitudes of the uncompensated gains and losses from 
co-operation.   As  can be seen from Table 5, and the last two columns, the gains that 
can be achieved if countries cooperate instead of acting independently are negative  
for  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Turkey, the 
former USSR, the UK and the former Yugoslavia and these  should be compensated.   
The aggregate gain from full co-operation is about 8 times higher when we 
assume a linear damage cost function compared to a non-linear one.  The former 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland and Switzerland are the biggest gainers from SW.   In previous work, 
Germany dominated the picture in Europe for the case of sulphur abatement (Halkos 
and Hutton, 1994). It seems that  the transition period of the incorporation of the 
former GDR into the FRG may have implied an intense period of change and GDR 
(one of the biggest polluters) was no longer restricted (as in the case its Eastern 
neighbours) by lack of finance  and other economic constraints. This rapid 
restructuring may therefore have increased the significance of the environmental 
gains for GDR but not necessarily for FRG. 
 It has to be mentioned that the results will change if we consider a 
simultaneous abatement of NOX and ammonia (NH3).  Amann and Klaassen (1993) 
claim that simultaneous control of NOX and NH3 emissions can accomplish the same 
nitrogen deposits as the maximum feasible reductions of NOX emissions only, and 
with 23% lower abatement costs. Depending on deposition targets, simultaneous 
reduction can reduce European abatement costs between 13 and 80%.  Thus the 
consideration of the two pollutants at the same time may lead to substantial cost 
savings. These cost savings are attained by replacing expensive ways of abating NOX 
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emissions (for instance, the three-way catalyst for gasoline cars) by inexpensive 
control of NH3 emissions. According to Amann and Klaassen, the cost-effective 
options to reduce ammonia are the low-ammonia application of manure for all 
animal categories, stable adaptations (such as manure flushing) and abatement of 
industrial emissions. The cost estimates depend on animal type and technology. The 
main cost parameters are the stable  size, the amount of manure used etc.  Additional 
reductions may be achieved in the chemical industry by applying stripping and 
absorption techniques.   Cost estimates for NH3 emissions are more uncertain than 
those of NOX due to lack of practical experience.  
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 Using recent data on nitrogen oxides emissions and depositions, together with 
new detailed estimates of abatement costs, estimates of the total costs of NOX 
pollution for 26 European countries have been derived. These estimates allowed the 
calculations of the effects of non-cooperative policies to the case of full co-operation. 
Among the main conclusions to be drawn is that estimates of the economic benefits 
from co-operation are higher when we assume a linear damage cost function 
compared with the assumption of a quadratic damage cost function.  In interpreting 
the derived figures, it is essential to recognise that the results derived using linear 
damage cost functions are completely insensitive to the total level of projected 
emissions. While tonnage figures may be compared with the case of assuming 
quadratic damage cost functions, abatement rates are not comparable.  This is a 
consequence of using linear damage functions which makes the figures for abatement 
rates simply functions of emission rates. Results for abatement tonnage under full co-
operation are therefore similar, whereas benefit estimates are different. Thus we tend 
to overestimate the benefits from co-operation.  
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 In general, Europe as a whole, benefit from co-operation, and the gains from 
co-operation permit compensation of the losers.  If countries cooperate they will 
achieve a more than four times higher emissions reduction for almost a double 
abatement cost.  At the same time, all countries will participate in the agreement and 
will be obliged to undertake responsibilities according to the damage caused and 
their cost-effectiveness in abating NOX emissions. 
 Finally, reducing NOX in stationary sources may involve the slowing down of 
the mixing rate of the fuel and air and the lowering of the temperature at which fossil 
fuels (oil/coal) are burnt.  Best available technologies for power plants, petroleum 
refineries and industrial boilers seem to be a combination of combustion 
modification and selective catalytic reduction achieving abatement efficiency of 
90%. At the same time the most cost-effective way to reduce nitrogen oxides 
emissions from gasoline cars is by fitting a three-way catalytic converter to the car 
exhaust.   It is worth mentioning that abating NOX emissions may lead to additional 
impacts on the environment, which have been excluded in this paper. For instance, 
the use of catalytic converters for cars reduce NOX but also volatile organic 
compounds (precursors both to tropospheric ozone in European cities) which were 
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